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Andean Pact Constitutionality:
A Final Word from Colombia
Occasionally the workings of the democratic institutions of a country
are painfully slow in fulfilling their constitutionally assigned roles. Yet
slow-paced as they may be, the mere fact of their function is verification
that the democratic processes of which they form a part are alive and
throbbing. This is particularly true when the institution in question is the
judicial branch of government and takes on added and profound signifi-
cance when the phenomenon occurs in Latin America, where the present
state of affairs of democratic institutions is deeply disturbing. The Supreme
Court of Colombia, a vital and truly independent branch of the Colombian
Government, has recently handed down a decision which apparently will
be the final and authoritative pronouncement in the protracted series of
battles over the constitutionality of the Acuerdo Subregional Andino, or
Acuerdo de Cartagena, more commonly referred to as the Pacto Andino
(Andean Pact). In none of the member countries has the Pact been sub-
jected to the intense judicial scrutiny it has undergone in Colombia.
On May 26, 1969 in the city of Bogoti, the representatives of Bolivia,
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru signed the Acuerdo de Cartagena.'
The purpose of the Pact is to bring about the economic integration of the
subregion covered by the territories of the member countries.2 The Pact
provides for mechanisms by means of which the member countries are
bound by the rules issued by agencies of the Pact such as the Commission
(made up of plenipotentiary representatives of the member countries)
which is the chief legislative branch of the Pact, and the Junta (Technical
Secretariat) comprised of three persons who must be citizens of the mem-
ber countries but who are required to act in a non-representative capacity.
Among the main functions of the Junta are to propose projects for Com-
mission approval, to determine whether acts by individual member coun-
tries constitute illegal restrictions on intra-Pact imports.
Almost from the very inception of its juridical life the Andean Pact
was subjected to strenuous tests of constitutionality before Colombia's high-
est tribunals. Some of the tests proved successful, resulting in a general
uncertainty within the private sector as to whether the Pact was part of
the law of Colombia or not. Particularly disquieting were the doubts
created as to the legal existence of a number of Commission resolutions
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referred to, in Pact terminology, as Decisions including the much dis-
cussed and debated Decision 24 "A Common System for Treatment of
Foreign Capital, Trademarks, Patents, Licenses and Royalties."
'3
The first test of constitutionality was brought in Colombia's Council
of State4 and the second before the Supreme Court.5 In both instances the
courts refused to rule on the -cases for lack of jurisdiction.
When by Decree 1299 of June 30, 1971 the Government attempted to
make the Cartagena Agreement part of the internal law of the country, it
too was submitted to a judicial test of constitutionality. On January 20,
1972 the Supreme Court handed down its judgment. It found that Decree
1299 was in fact unconstitutional on the basis that the Executive Branch
had usurped legislative power since the government had acted by decree
without first seeking legislative ratification. The Court, in substance, dis-
tinguished between the Government's signing of the Cartagena Agreement by
which it joined the Market, and its enactment of the ANCOM Code, on the
grounds that the former constituted an international act, which the Presi-
dent was authorized to implement by executive agreement, whereas the
latter was a matter primarily of domestic concern and required legislative
approval.
The Court's action wiped the Andean Code off the books as far as
Colombian law was concerned. As a result, the pre-Andean Code rules for
foreign investment 6 became governing enactments once more.
Through the device of new regulations expanding Colombia's former
foreign investment laws, the Executive quickly revived a substantial num-
ber of the Andean Code provisions.
The first of these regulations, promulgated by Presidential Decree 1234
of July 18,. 1972, re-introduced (in somewhat modified form) most of the
Andean Code rules, governing approval of license and technology agree-
ments for royalty remittance purposes. 7 The second, Resolution 17 of July
19, 1972 of the National Economic and Social Policy Council, re-introduced
(in still more modified form) various other Andean Code rules, including
the "fade-out" requirements (limited to new enterprises), as well as setting
forth detailed rules for calculating the net investment value for purposes
of determining reinvestment, profit remittance and capital repatriation
ceilings.
After lengthy Congressional debates and hearings on the Pact and its
ancillary laws, the Colombian Congress on April 14, 1973 passed Law 8
whereby it approved the Pact. This was then followed by the Government's
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adoption of the Foreign Investment Decisions 24, 37 and 37-A by Decree
1900 of September 13, 1973. In adopting the Pact, 'Congress imposed a
number of conditions and directions addressed to the Executive Branch.
a) The National Government was authorized to put into legal effect
the decisions of the Pact Commission and Junta that did not modify exist-
ing domestic legislation nor were legislative subject matter.
b) Pact decisions would, on the other hand, have to be submitted to
Congress for approval whenever the subject matter covered by them was
within the jurisdiction of Congress, when they modified existing legisla-
tion or when the Government had not been properly empowered with legal
authority.
c) The Government was required to solicit the prior views of a
special Congressional Committee before approving Commission Decisions
relating to certain matters such as, modifications of the Cartagena Agree-
ment and programs of harmonization of the instruments which regulate
the foreign trade of the Pact members.
In an action brought before the Supreme Court, the Tribunal was
asked to declare unconstitutional the conditions and restrictions imposed
on the Executive Branch by Congress in Law 8. In a decision of February
27, 1975 the Court found that it had jurisdiction to hear the case despite
the fact that there existed a string of Supreme Court decisions dating back
to 1914 holding that the Court had no jurisdiction to hear cases in which
claims are made as to the unconstitutionality of laws approving public
treaties. The Court brushed past these decisions holding that in the in-
stant case none of the clauses of Law 8 which are claimed to be uncon-
stitutional in fact approve any treaty but rather are aimed at regulating
the effects of the measures which might be adopted by the Commission
and the Junta. To some this is a very narrow view of the scope of prior
decisions and may very well have reflected a desire to state the final
word on the constitutionality of the Andean Pact.
The Court proceeded to restate the Constitutional principles it found
decisive in disposing of the issues in the case.
1. Once a treaty has been lawfully entered into, it rests with the
Executive Branch to determine which are the means most efficacious for
fulfilling the treaty obligations. Consequently, paragraph 3 of Art. 2 of
Law 8 was held unconstitutional in that it required that Commission deci-
sions be submitted to Congress for approval and implementation when they
involve matters within the jurisdiction of the Legislature.
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2. International treaties signed by the President and approved by
Congress are binding.' Once so approved a treaty has the force of law
and cannot be denied recognition, not even by laws enacted subsequent
to the one approving the treaty. It follows that treaties are of higher rank
and force than simple legislative acts, including the very act by which the
treaty is approved. In view of these principles Art. 2 of Law 8 was found
unconstitutional in that it contradicted the Andean Pact by requiring cer-
tain conditions be met before Pact decisions could become operative in
Colombia e.g. prior congressional approval of decisions which modify
existing internal legislation.
3. The Constitution provides that the State may, through legally
adopted treaties, bind itself to "the creation of supra-national institutions
whose objective is to promote and consolidate economic integration with
other States."9 When such institutions are created, as in the case of the
Commission and Junta, they have the power to dictate regional rules
hierarchically superior to internal law of Colombia. For this reason also
the Colombian Legislature had no authority to subject Commission of
Junta decisions to the requirement of prior congressional approval regard-
less of their effect on local legislation.
Is one to conclude from these unequivocal terms that regardless of
what determinations or decisions are made by the Andean Pact Commis-
sion and Junta, Colombia is bound thereby? The Court is careful to point
out that such is not the case.
When member countries of the Andean Zone or the Pact agen-
cies themselves attempt to impose on other members conduct
which they believe to be violative of the Cartagena Agreement,
they may and should recur to the means which the Agreement
provides for resolving differences over the interpretation or mean-
ing of the Commission's decisions,' 0 or the various appropriate
international remedies, if they are inadequate.
Of particular interest in this connection is the Court's statement with
respect to recourses available within the normal Colombian procedural
system:
When, as has been indicated, national acts which carry out and
execute Andean decisions are reputed to be contrary to superior
rules of Colombian law, legal control over them may be exer-
cised by the correctional processes available and applicable in
the country.
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The proposition the Court appears to be setting forth is that it is not pos-
sible to question the legality of an Andean Pact decision per se through
the normal procedural channels, however when the decision is internally
implemented by a local decree or law then the full range of national con-
trols over legality and constitutionality are available. If this is the mean-
ing of the foregoing language then the degree of definitiveness of Andean
Pact decisions within Colombia may be considerably lessened, given the
country's penchant for strict constitutional control of laws.
KIRKWOOD, KAPLAN, RUSSIN & VECCHI, LTDA.
NOTES
lVenezuela joined the Pact subsequently.
2Art. 1 of the Pact states that:
The objectives of the present Agreement are to promote the balanced and
harmonic development of the Member Countries, to accelerate their growth
through economic integration, to facilitate their participation in the inte-
gration process foreseen in the Treaty of Montevideo, and to establish favor-
able, conditions for the conversion of LAFTA into a common market,
all of this with the final aim of achieving a persistent improvement in the
standard of living of the inhabitants of the Subregion.
3 See Schliesser Restrictions on Foreign Investment in the Andean Common
Market, in 5 The Int'l Law 3 (1971), Perenzin, Regulation of the Andean Invest-
ment Code: Colombia, in 4 Lawyer of the Americas, L.J. 15 (1972).
4 Council of State Decision of June 5, 1971.
5 Supreme Court Decision of July 27, 1971.
6 Decree Laws 444 and 688 of 1967.
7Those contained in Decree 1299 of 1971, Arts. 19 and 20 and Decree 2153 of
1971, Arts. 23, 24, 27, 28, 29 (last sentence) and 30-3.
8Constitution, Art. 76-18 and 120-20.
9Constitution Art. 78-18.
10Art. 23 of the Cartagena Agreement provides:
It shall correspond to the Commission to carry out the procedures of nego-
tiation, good offices, mediation and conciliation that may be necessary when
discrepancies arise over the interpretation or execution of the present Agree-
ment or of the Decisions of the Commission.
If agreement is not reached, the Member Countries shall subject them-
selves to the procedures established in the "Protocol for the Solution of
Controversies" signed in Asunci6n on September 2. 1967 by the Foreign
Ministers of the Contracting Parties of the Treaty of Montevideo.
For the purposes contemplated in the third clause of Art. 16 of that Pro-
tocol, the Member Countries declare that it shall cover all matters included
in the present Agreement and in the Decisions of the Commission.
For the purposes of Art. 36 of the said Protocol, the Member Countries
commit themselves to take steps to attain its ratification as rapidly as
possible.
